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FOREWORD
Information Service for Officers was established by the Chief

of Naval Personnel in 1948. Published herewith is the first issue of
Volume II.

VQlume II, like Volume I, will contain lectures and articles con

sidered of professional interest to offi�ers of the naval service. Opin
ions expressed in this publication are those of the author and not
necessarily those of the Navy Department or the Naval War College.
The many valuable suggestions ofl'ered by readers of Volume I
are acknowledged. These have been carefully considered and many

will be incorporated in Volume II.
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LEADERSHIP
a lecture delivered by

Dr. Douglas S. Freeman
at the Naval War College
May 11, 1949

I am certainly grateful to the Admiral for his introduction.
Speech-making is bad enough in any event-it's a terrible thing
but I don't know that it's any worse than speech-listening. The
worst thing about it is having what is known as a Who's Who intro
duction. Some man with an edition of Who's Who about ten years
old gets up and gives everybody your biography from Who's Who,
and by the time he gets through you say to yourself, "Well God

knows there is but one thing left to do and that is to bury me." Of
course when I get up, there are a good many who think that if I

have not been buried and dug up, at least I am what they some
times call me at Army and Navy schools, "the Rip Van Winkle of the
armed services." That is because I have had the pleasure of study
ing the history of our armed forces for a period of now almost forty

years.

When I was a lad I had the great pleasure, the infinite honor,
some of the great men of the war between the states.
seeing
of
S trange as it seems, I can remember Jubal Early. What a somber
(I almost said a sinister) figure he was as he walked around town,
chewing tobacco fiercely and leaning on a long staff. As soon as we

little lads would see him we would run away because it was thorough
ly understood among all of us lads of about five years old or there
abouts that General Early ate a little boy for breakfast every day.

I remember John B. Gordon; I remember Fitzhugh Lee; I re
member James Longstreet. I knew well a number of the younger
Doctor Freeman is one of Virginia's most distinguished citizens.
Since 1915 he has been editor of the Richmond News Leader. He has
lectured extensively at various service colleges and has written a num
ber of books including Robert E. Lee (Pulitzer Prize 1934) and Lee's
Lieutenants. He is now writing the biography of George Washington.
Dr. Freeman has not edited these remarks.
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staff officers of General Lee and General Jackson. I knew personally
and talked often with three of General Lee's staff officers, one of
them his Assistant Adjutant General, and of course I knew the
leaders of the Spanish War, of the First World War and of the
Second World War. Many of these men of the Second World War
I taught at the War College. And it was amusing beyond ex
pression to go to headquarters immediately after · hostilities, to go
to General Eisenhower's headquarters, or to General Clark's head
quarters, or to General MacArthur's headquarters and see some of
these men I had known as majors at the War College, stand up
and say, "My God, am I going to have my historical photograph
taken now?" So those are the circumstances that make me feel, as
it were, that I am the Rip Van Winkle of the armed services.
But no man can go through this long stretch of years and
have the honor of seeing these great men without having an admira
tion for them, an admiration for the service and a ;reverence for the
leadership that these men exemplify. I have seen a new chapter of it
during the last year because I have been studying George Wash
ington after he came to the command of the American Army in
June 1775. Nothing that he had ever done before showed the
qualities that he then displayed. I don't think anybody who studied
Washington as he was in 1759 is prepared for what Washington
was in 1775. I think strangely enough, that out of his civilian
training, out of all the difficulties he had to endure, there developed
the patience, the maturity of judgment, the essential sanity that
were the hallmark of the remarkable ability of that man.
You know we look at Washington usually through the silly,
stupid pages of Parson Weems or as we see him in the portraits of
Gilbert Stuart. I think either approach is wrong. Washington
wasn't the stupid prig that he is made out to be by Weems, nor
was he the embalmed celebrity that he appears to be in Gilbert

2
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Stuart's portraits. Of course, many of the portraits of Gilbert
Stuart are pretty good works of art of the type and of the age
(he made a good living in portraits of George Washington), but per
sonally, except for the one at the Boston Art Museum, I'd like
to see all the Gilbert Stuart's of Washington destroyed. I wish
they were all burned up because they give such a false impression
of the man. The Peal portraits of him, even the Trumbull portraits,
have so much more of the vitality that was Washington-the
sanity, the judgment, the humanity that was his. You who are
older used to see George Washington presented to you in front of
the East Portico of the Capitol. Washington, being a modest man,
I think would have been very much embarrassed if he had seen
how nearly naked he was presented in that statue of him in front
of the Capitol where he sits in a Roman toga which would suit
Washington weather in July and no other weather in the world.
And he sits there with his hand outstretched as if saying, as
Lorado Taft used to put it, "My body lies over at Mount Vernon
my clothes in the Pension Office.
He exemplified leadership which is not anything like as com
plicated as some of the psychologists would make it out to be.
Psychology is going to be a great subject one of these days. Now
it's just in its infancy, and when we try to apply it in the
abstract to problems of leadership we usually make monkeys of
ourselves; we don't get very far. Leadership is fundamentally
common-sense and mankind. Maybe I'm going to over-simplify
it for you this afternoon, because I'm going to say that it con
sists fundamentally of three things and three only. If a man
meets these three conditions he is going to be a leader; if he fails
to meet them he may be on the roster as the head of a command,
but he will never be at the head of that command when it marches
down the pages of history-never!
First,

know your stuff. Know your stuff, just that. If you
3
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are an aviator, know it. And know something else besides. We
are entirely too much disposed in the American armed services
now to have men who begin their professional career on too narrow
a foundation and they go up and up and up, and the higher they
go the thinner their knowledge is. We have to have specialists .
but very few of them can afford to be primarily the leaders of
men. Our advanced specialists, they must be men who know
something about leadership but they are primarily laboratory men
-research men. The leader must have a broad foundation if he
is going to keep his position. Know-know. your own branch, know
the related arms of the service; you can't know too much if you
are going to be a successful leader. And know the yesterdays. I

have always said, and said many times here at the War College
through the years, "Don't rely on us military historical writers
too much. We don't know but so much. We can't fight wars." But
after all don't ignore the yesterdays of war in your study of today
and of tomorrow.
I always thought that one of the finest things that ever was
said about MacArthur was that when he had a period in which
he was relieved of active administrative duties and was for three

months able to do as he pleased, he took those three months and
caught up on everything that he could read in order to bring his
knowledge of today into line with the yesterdays of war. The
same thing is true of Marshall. Marshall is one of the most avid

readers of military history that I know. The same thing is true
. of Nimitz. Of course Nimitz sometimes made bad choices of his
reading. He said to me one time for example, "Ah, Doctor, you never
will know how grateful I am to you," and he mentioned one of my
books that he had read at Guam while he was in command there.
I said, "How is that, Admiral?" "Well," he replied, "every night
after I had finished my duties I would go to bed and turn on the
light and I would read for about half an hour of some of General

4
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Lee's problems in dealing with his subordinates. Then I would go
peacefully to sleep, because I would reason then that General
Lee's problems of command were infinitely greater than mine were,
and that I had a far easier time with my subordinates than he
had with his." I said, "Admiral, you never were more mistaken
in your life; you had "cuckoos" and some "prima donnas" with you
and I'll not argue with you about that, but what put you to sleep
was not peace of mind-it was my style."
Know your stuff-know your specialty, know the back
ground of military history. Know it so that when the man comes
up to you and says, �'What do I do in these circumstances, with
this weapon, with this gun?", you can tell him, and if you don't
know and want to be a leader, then for Heaven's sake tell him hon
estly, "I don't know." A man very seldom loses the respect of his
men if he says he doesn't know something when he can dem
onstrate that he knows something else, but look out for that man
who tries to bluff about his knowledge.
I was dealing one time with a very tough audience and I
happened during the course of my remarks to say something about
Iwo Jima. I didn't think I was doing so hot myself. I wasn't
getting on so well, but when we came around to the question period,
some man way back in the audience said, "Doctor, you have been
talking about Iwo Jima; would you mind discoursing for a minute
on what you think of the tactics of small landing parties as they
were employed at Iwo." I said, "I don't know a thing in God's world
about it." I saw my audience was very much relieved from that
minute. If you don't know, say so and try to find out.
Know your stuff. Now that means a lot in the way of the
utilization of your time. And it means a lot in the way of utilization
of a Navy wife or an Army wife. You boys think you have
a hard life to lead. You don't have any tougher life to

5
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And both the Navy hus
lead than the life of a Navy wife.
they can, when they can.
all
learn
to
band and the Navy wife need
I'd like to give you a little motto on that question. I gave it to one
of my historical secretaries. She happens to be the one who came
up with me this morning. She said it was the most useful thing
I'd ever told her. It came from Oliver Wendell Holmes, a Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States, who should have been
Chief Justice. Holmes would get a boy from Harvard Law School
every year, and that boy would have one year as Holmes' law
clerk, a magnificent training, out of which in their generation have
come some of the best lawyers in public service in America. And
one of the favorite things that he would tell these boys was,

"Young man, make the most of the scraps of time." Now, believe
me, if you want to know your stuff and know it better than the
other man, you've got to spend more time on it, and if you are
going to spend more time on it you've got to make the most of the
scraps of time. The difference between mediocrity and distinction

in many a professional career is the organization of your time. Do
you organize it, do you make the most of the scraps of time?
Bless my soul, I don't suppose that the Admiral with his dignity
and justice and regard for all the amenities says "no" to you about
playing bridge, but there is many a man who would have three
more stripes on his sleeve if he gave to study the time that he gives

to bridge. Don't say that you have to have the recreation. You have
to have enough recreation, but diversification of work fa the surest
recreation of the mind. You don't have to go and forget the whole
world. You have to work different brain centers and that is all you
need to do. If you do it you get the recreation and out of the recrea
tion you will get the training. Write it down, my young seamen, my
young mariners (I love the word "mariner")-write it down, "Make
the most of the scraps of time."

If we have another war, which Almighty God forbid, and I

6
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol2/iss7/1

10

Naval War College: September 1949 Full Issue

RESTRICTED

know not one single leader in the armed services who does not
say Amen to that-if we have another war it is going to be a
highly technical war, but the older principles of leadership will stand.
Number one will remain-know your stuff.
I have not a record of a single American soldier, a single
American admiral who, when all was said and done, was not pro
ficient in the knowledge of his specialty. Don't think the time spent

at schools is lost either. Professional training for war is a cate
gorical imperative of efficiency. In history I believe I knew General
Lee's Brigadier, Major, and Lieutenant Generals pretty well. I think
I have written about most of them, however poorly. Of all that com
pany there were only two who became distinguished division com
manders who had not had professional training.

This idea of the inspiration of the soldier is nonsense. The
idea that out of the great body of our people, you are going to get
soldiers of high emminence-there is absolutely nothing to it. If you
require professional training to save the lives of men in peace,
and you call the man who does it a physician-are you not likewise
called upon to have professional traininl{ for war in order to save the
lives of men in war? And that man you call an Admiral or you call
him a General. Professional training is worthwhile. The best
money that ever was spent on the Navy of this country has been
the money that was spent here at Newport. I don't believe any
man can contradict that.

Know your stuff-and be a man. That is number two. Be
a man. We have had some leaders in American history who may

not have been all they ought to have been in their regard for some of

the amenities of life, but I never· knew a great American seaman,
I never knew a great American soldier, or read about one, who was
not fundamentally a man. And that means a man of character; it
means a man of industry; it means

a

man of fair play. We were

7
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talking at the house of the President of this College a little while ago
about the matter of courage. And the Admiral said to me, "Doctor,
have you ever found in history any process by which you can tell
whether a man is going to show courage in action?" I said, "No, you
never can; I don't believe you ever will. If we do, it will be thousands
of years hence and by that time, please God, we may have sense
enough not to fight wars." But this is a fact-the type of courage
that keeps a man from turning his back on his adversaries and
running away is one thing. That is not so uncommon. But the type
of courage that is shown by a leader who will take his part of the
load in all circumstances-that's a much rarer type of courage.
What is the coward? Who is the coward in the high rank?
He is not apt to be a physical craven but he is a man who some
times tries to pass on to the other fellow the more difficult job and
won't do his own. You take that great Captain of the state from
which I have the honor of coming. You can see beautiful stories of
the physical courage of General Robert E Lee. I never go to Wash
ington from Richmond on Highway No. 1 that I don't see the
house where he was standing one day on the porch, with a glass
of buttermilk between the table and his mouth, when a round shot
came within four feet of him and shattered the lintel of the door.
You can see the place there today, and it was said that no man ob
served a quiver when the glass went to his mouth. I have read the
story of how he conducted himself on that bloody field of Spotsyl,
vania Courthouse. That is fine, but if you want to see what courage
is, what the real test of the man is, you read Lee's farewell to
Jackson on the 2nd of May 1863. When Jackson, called upon to
make the great turning movement there at Chancellorsville, was
asked by General Lee, "What troops do you propose to make this
movement with?" Jackson said, "My whole corps, sir." Lee then had
about fifty thousand men. Jackson wanted to take twenty-eight
thousand of them, put them in motion around the flank and leave

8
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Lee twenty-two thousand men with which to face the Federals while
Jackson was out of action and making that movement around the
flank. Lee could have said, "Why those are impossible figures. Take
fourteen thousand men, and leave me enough at least with which to
defend this line against these seventy-five thousand Federals here in

the wilderness." Not so. Lee knew what concentration of force
meant; Lee knew the doctrine of superiority of force at the point of
contact. Lee had the courage to take his chance in order that his
comrade might have superiority of force for difficult offensive op

erations. In that, gentlemen-and it is repeated gloriously a hun
dred times in American history-in that you see what I mean by the

word courage. What I mean by the words:

be a man.

Aye. Be a man who is disciplined in spirit. Be a man who is
observant. How many fine persons there are who go through this

world. Never forget and, as God gives me might, I shall never fail
on a lecture to mention Cadmus Marcellus Wilcox-Cadmus Marcel
lus Wilcox and his observation of a string over the shoulder of the
Federals in that same battle of Chancellorsville. Remember Cadmus
Marcellus Wilcox? What a name. Cadmus had his orders, "You move
when the Federals do. You've got one' little brigade here; you a1·e
holding Banks Ford and when they move, you move." Cadmus went
out the next morning early. (Every good seaman ought to be out
early. People talk about what you ought to do for the redemption of
the American people. The American people need nothing in this
world more than they need to get up earlier and to go to bed
earlier.) Cadmus Marcellus got up earlier than most men, and he
went out and looked, which a great many people never do, and over
Banks Ford he saw that Federal sentinel walking his post, and an
other and another down the line, in plain view. Well there is nothing

uncommon about a sentinel walking his post is there? But Mar
cellus wasn't content with that; Marcellus took his glasses and he

looked at that sentinel who may have been thinking about anything

9
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under the sun other than his military duties; and Marcellus observed
that over that sentinel's shoulder there was a string, and behind
that sentinel's left hip as he looked at the end of the string was his
haversack. And Marcellus looked at the next sentinel and he had on
his haversack and the next and the next and Marcellus said to him
self, "Those birds are getting ready to move because if they were
simply in camp they wouldn't have on their haversacks and their
haversacks wouldn't be full. They have got their rations on them
because they are getting ready to move." He ordered his artillery
hitched, got his infantry in position and within fifteen minutes after
those Federals started their withdrawal, Marcellus was in the road

and he hadn't gone three miles before he had the great opportunity
of his career to stop a Federal offensive.

Observation! Be a man, not a blind man. Might as well
go down in the engine room and stay there if you are not going to
look and see.
Last of all, the third point. Look after your men. Look after
your men. What a simple thing you are saying, Rip Van Winkle!
Here you have three-fourths of the brass and nine-tenths of the
brains of the American Navy before you and you are saying that
leadership is three things and you have listed those things so
simply. Know your stuff-be a man-and look after your men. We
came a long way to hear you Rip Van Winkle and is that all you
have to say? Yes! That is all, because that is the sum observation of
my travels. Look after your men.
I mention to you the fact that as a youth I saw those gray
columns moving up the street and I heard the clatter of cavalry
forty years after. I saw those men who had thrust through the
wilderness, those men who had stood at Second Manassas, and
those who had climbed the hill at Gettysburg and had their red
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banners with them until twenty.:.two of. those flags were there on
one acre in the Federal position. I saw them; I knew many of them,
and often I asked them, "Tell me, that great man who is our southern
demagogue, this Lee, what was there about him that made you
reverence him? What was there in him that made you tell us that
next to the love of God and His Son, there had to be reverence
for him?" An incredibly simple answer, my friends, they gave me.
"Oh," they said, over and over again, "he looked after his men!
We knew that when he demanded anything of us, it was be
cause he had to. And when he said, 'Men, you must take that

height', we took it, because we knew that was the cheapest thing to
do." He looked after his men. So did the Lieutenants-some of
the men to you unknown. Did you ever hear of the name of
John R. Cooke? Some of you did; just a Brigadier General in the
Confederate Army. I remember him well, an old man running a
grocery store, an unprosperous grocery store. He had in his head the

- most beautiful bullet hole you ever saw in your life. He must
have been hard-headed-it never crackeq his skull. One day when
he was in his thirties he was commanding two little regiments
at Sharpsburg. On his left early in the morning something had
happened. Something had gone wrong even with Stonewall Jack
son, and the . flank had been swept back. The Federals were at
the Dunker Church, and Hood's great Texans, the Grenadier Guard
:>f the Confederacy were panting in the woods. The tide swept
around to the center on that segmented battlefield. There an im
pression was made, not too deep. Cooke stood there, a little salient
-two regiments ; and against his fire, with the supporting artillery

around the Dunker Church a Federal corps broke · itself in vain.
During the fight Longstreet sent word to him and asked him if
he wanted help, and I am told that of all the classic cussing that
ever has been heard in the American Army�and the American
Army sometimes casts reflections on its adversary's ancestry back
six or eight generations-there never had been heard such words as

11
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those that Cooke sent back. "Give him help! Not until every man he
had was pursuing through hell the last Yankee in front of him!"

Or words to that effect. I said to myself, "What is in that man?
What made that Twenty-seventh North Carolina regiment that

way? This Third Arkansas-Arkansas is a good state, good fight

ers. They have some mighty long-winded politicians among them,

but what made that Third Arkansas regiment do that?" And I

took the pains to go back and I found that from the very time

that Cooke had taken over that regiment (he had been a captain

in the regular army before the war) he had done everything he

could to tell those men, "I am going to p.emand the maximum
you and I am going to do the maximum

for

of

you." He held them

to the highest standards and he did for them everything that a

man could to protect them from casualties.

Look after your men-it means many things; it means

many things that you don't think about. It means mail facilities;

it means food. General Lee, no matter how much impoverished

his commissariat was, never failed to increase his men's rations

after they had won a fight. Hot food is one of the greatest

builders of morale in the history of war. Looking after your men
means looking after their clothes.

I was telling one of the of

ficers today how much emphasis George Washington laid on the

cleanliness of person. That great builder of morale, that same
Lee,

when

he

got

his men out of a dirty campaign always

tried to put them by a stream where they could wash. And the

most valiant men were the men who, if they needed it, got the

new uniforms. Look after your men and your men will look after
you. I don't believe there has ever been an exception to that

dictum.

I said one day to MacArthur, "You know, I think when

I come to write the history of your campaign, there from the

12
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Solomons northward, one of the things I am going to find the
most difficult to understand is how you did so much with so

little." Well he lighted his corn-cob pipe for the four hundred and
fifty-third time that afternoon, and made the seventeenth oration
that he had delivered to me that day, and he said many things
that were absolutely true and sound.

And we talked about his

casualties, about how few there were in terms of what was done.

I said, "Difficult as it was, you looked after your men." And I
quoted him some of the things I told you. He said, "Well if there

was economy of life, it is something for which"-and he dropped

all bis theatric�! manner-"something for which I will be grate

ful to the end of my days." He said, "When I thought about the

number who were killed, nothing could console me except the

thought that maybe by God's grace and hard effort we had saved

some that might otherwise have been slain." He is a tall man; be
got up and walked the floor as he sometimes did when he spoke,

•

but believe me be grew taller and taller in my eyes as he spoke
,
those words.
Gentlemen, have I over-simplified this case? I think some

times we over-complicate it. I think sometimes we take these boo\s

on psychology, we take all the arts of salesmenship and we try
to apply them to the armed services in a manner that is too

elaborate. I don't believe I'm over-simplifying when I say to you,

know your stuff, be a man, look after your men.

Remember you may in God's mercy have had your day of

battle. You who were there in the Arctic night-you who flew across
the hump-you who went from South America to Africa-you who

fought those submarines up and down our coast-you who went

out from Pearl Harbor never knowing whether that submarine

would come back again or whether your burial place ever would be
known to men-you who were in the supply service-you who

..
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were in the battlefield-you who had the immortal honor of serv
ing with Spruance, with Kinkaid, with Halsey-you may have
had your day, you may live until over it all comes the glamour

of the years and you may tell the tale so often that y��•ll hardly
be able to distinguish the fabric from the embroidery. Such things

happen. On the other hand your challenge may lie ahead-the era
of atomic warfare may bring us problems vaster than anybody

ever faced before.

I covet but one thing for you and that is, if you �me to
the final day which must for America always be the day of vic
tory, I covet for you nothing more than that in the day of victory
you can say with a clear conscience what was said by the van

quished as he rode back through those thin gray ranks across

the red hills of Appomattox one day in April 1865. The men
knew that something had happened because he had been in the
midst of the Federal lines. They broke ranks, they thronged
the road, they gathered around him, they put up their hands.
"General!" they said, "General! Are we surrendered? General!
Give us another chance, we'll fight them now." He said "No, my
men. I've done for you the best I knew how to do." Your nation
demands of you no less than that; your conscience should ask no
more than that you do the best.

14
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TURKEY
A lecture delivered by

Professor Walter L. Wright, Jr.
at the Naval War College
February 23, 1949

Gentlemen, it is a great pleasure to have the person who in

troduces you as a lecturer not only state the text on which you

are to speak but also the conclusion at which you are going to ar

rive.

This is not entirely astonishing to me because I am aware

that the Straits of the Bosporous and the Dardanelles have been

househO'ld words in the Navy Department ever since 1800, when

Admiral Bainbridge very unwillingly sailed the

Washington

up

through those straits and passed the batteries on the Dardanelles.

To carry you back for a moment to the days of sail (which

I understand is not always unwelcome to sailors), Bainbridge was

ordered by the Dey of Algiers to take a special emissary to his
overlord, the Sultan of Turkey. The Dey threatened to blow the

Washington

out of the sea with his shore batteries if Bainbridge

refused. He therefore started under duress flying the Algerian

flag, but as soon as he got out of range of the batteries he
sent a sailor up the mast and took the flag down, and there

after he sailed under the Stars and Stripes. When he got to the

entrance of the Dardanelles, where there were great forts on
either side, he knew that a strange and unknown flag would be
fired upon.

He wasn't going to strike the American flag so he

had to find a solution. The solution was this: he headed straight

in toward the anchorage near one of these forts, and as he
The late Professor Wright spent many years in the Near East
as an instructor in the American University of Beirut, Syria, and as
President of the American College for Girls and Robert College, both
in Istanbul, Turkey.
The Naval War College takes this opportunity of expressing its
deep regret at the death of Professor Wrizht. May 16th. 1949.
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went in he began furling sail and firing a salute. Of course the
salute was fired with black powder and there was plenty of smoke.
As soon as he had a good smoke screen in the air, he began un
furling sail, and the first thing the Turkish artillerymen on shore
knew, the Washington under full sail was emerging from her
cloud of smoke, already out of range of their guns, which were
in fixed emplacements and couldn't be shifted as the ship moved.
So, to American sailors, these are familiar waters-the Darda

nelles, the Sea of Marmara, and the Bosporous. You don't need,
therefore, to be told a great deal about the general strategic
importance of Turkey, which is the possessor of these narrow
seas, these straits leading from the Black Sea into the Aegean.
There has been a good deal of talk since 1939 to the ef

fect that these straits have lost their importance; that the range
of air bombardment is such that the Aegean Sea in itself is a suf
ficiently narrow area to make the use of naval forces in any great
number impossible, and there is, of course, a good deal of truth in

this statement. Certainly the Aegean Sea, which is nowhere more
than two hundred miles wide, offers very little opportunity for
maneuver when you can get an air force out there any hour of the
day. On the other hand, the crucial point within this narrow area
has simply been lengthened by the addition of air force and the pos
sibility of air attack. The tightest point in the long narrow passage
is still the straits leading from the Black Sea to the Marmara and
into the Aegean.

I suppose that it's appropriate to mention one major
strategic point which I will refer to later. From the point of view
of those who are most concerned with the straits, their major im
portance formerly was that behind the straits lay a body of water
large enough for the training of a massive fleet, which might, if

the straits were opened to it, emerge fully prepared for battle in

16
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That was the basic

consideration, undoubtedly, in British naval thinking in the nine

teenth century. I think it's still true. It's still true, but it is also

true that, in 'order to have this facility, a power which might build
such a fleet (which might be at the present time the Soviet Union)

would have to possess far more territory than merely the straits

themselves. It would be necessary for that power to possess at least

the coasts of Asiatic Turkey, because only in that way could it
provide the necessary air cover for its ships going from the Aegean
to the Eastern Mediterranean.

Some of these points will come up

again later so I shall not unduly stress them at the present moment.
·' .

The country, Turkey, with which I'tn dealing this morning

is by present day count a small country. It has approximately the

same area as the two American states of California and Montana.

The area is about two hundred and ninety four thousand square
miles, and those two states are a little bit larger than that.

It has

very much the same topography. If you look at the map, you'll

realize that all of the coast of Turkey is mountainous, that the en
tire peninsula is surrounded by a wall of mountains, and on the

seaward side of those mountains there are a certain number of

plains, for the most part small plains, and in many cases very bad

ly connected with the interior of the country.

Only one of the

major sea-c�asts of Turkey has any good ports in it.

On the en

tire northern coast, on the Black Sea, there is not one single port

which could accommodate a naval vessel of any importance what

19

soever.

There is a great dearth even of beaches which could be

used for beach landings.

The northern coastal range of mountains

starting with Mount Olympus, which rises to a height of eighty four

hundred feet, continues to rise in height all the way along, up to the
Caucasus peaks, thirteen to fourteen thousand feet high.

Of course

the final high point of the country is Mt. Ararat which is ap
proximately seventeen thousand feet in height.

17
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From Istanbul, in the Bosphorus, down to the southwestern
corner of the peninsula you have a great succession of very fine
natural ports. There is only one developed port (and when I say
developed, I use the word with reservation) and that is the partial
ly developed port of Izmir, formerly called Smyrna.
On the southern coast again you have a mountain range
running right along the shore, and no developed ports whatever un
til you get down to Alexandretta (which the Turks call Iskender'."
un) in the extreme south corner-the southern extension of
Turkey.·

Now you realize from looking at the map that the mass of
the population is in the Aegean river valleys which are very fertile.
This is the region of Smyrna figs and Smyrna raisins. There is also a
. thick population along the Black Sea coast, in spite of the fact that
there is only a small amount of arable ground. That is because this
region is the only region in Turkey which has a very heavy rain
fall. In the extreme eastern part of the Black Sea coast you have a
rainfall such as you have in Sitka, Alaska-extremely heavy rain
fall with rain practically every day.
The communcations from the coasts to the interior of Turkey
are, by modern reckoning, very poor at every point, but the best
communications that .do exist are rail communicatons and we have
these running in from the port of Alexandretta, then through the
Cilician plain and through the great Taurus mountain range up
into the central plateau. Between Mersin on the Cilician coast and
Smyrna there is no railway reaching the sea. Between Smyrna and
Istanbul, there is no other railway connecting a port with the in
terior. Along the Black Sea coast there are two railways running
from the coast inland. One starts at Zonguldak, which is the area
in which Turkish .coal is produced. Here is a very sizeable coal
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field, with a very adequate quality of bituminous coal. The rail
way runs from there up to the capital of the country, high on the
interior plateau at Ankara. A second railway starting from Sam
sun, the great tobacco port on the Black Sea, connects with the
internal system of railways which form a sort of very loose net
around practically the whole country.
You realize, then, that this peninsula, surrounded by
mountains on every side, with narrow coastal plains, with few
communications with the interior, with very few ports of any con
sequence, is not what you would call exactly an attractive place on
which one could1and forces in the face of opposition. Nevertheless,
unattractive as it is, it's an area which must be studied. It must
be studied, basically because of the position which it occupies in
the world. Turkey is a finger pointing westward. It lies at the
point where Asia and Europe meet; it lies surrounded by seas;
it has as central a location in the geography of the world as any
country you could mention. It's not marginal, it isn't merely on
the edge of the Asiatic continent. It is the link which joins the
Asiatic continent to Europe which is, itself, nothing more than
a peninsula of the vast mass of Asia.
You know your maps, I'm sure, as well as I, so it's hardly
appropriate for me to enlarge too much on this fact. But I think
it's well to call your attention to the increase in the importance
of this territory as a result of modern developments in warfare. As

I pictured it to you, it is obviously a sort of a natural fortress. Not
only is it surrounded by mountains, but it is large enough to have
within that wall of mountains plenty of room for the building of
airfields-for the servicing of armies. In other words, it is a big
enough fortress to serve as a base of operations in any direction
and the directions which are attractive are very obvious.
Let me look at it first of all from the Kremlin; it is very
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obvious that one of the most important things we have to do is use
our imagination and put ourselves in the position of the people
with whom we may have violent disagreements. From the point
of view of the Kremlin, here is this potentially great fortress,
lying about two hundred miles from Russian territory across the
Black Sea. Not just any Russan territory, but the industrial heart
of Russia, built around the Donets coal basin. That two to three
hundred miles is no distance at all from the point of view of mod
ern bombing, as you are very well aware. Not only is that a very
vulnerable part of Russia which would be in danger of attack if
Turkey were in unfriendly hands, but, no further away from
Turkish territory and on the western shore of the Caspian Sea
is the greatest of the existing Russian oil fields, the great Baku. oil
field. It isn't producing what it did a few years ago, but, so far
as we know, it is still the major producing oil field of Russia. These
are very vital objectives, and I think it is very apparent, there
fore, why the Soviet Union is anxious to make sure that Turkey
is not being used as the base for an attack, nor in a position to be
used as a base for an attack, on the Soviet Union. And, pushing
that just a little bit further, it is also clear why it would be a.
great advantage to Russia if Turkey were in Russia's possession,
a satellite state, or under Russian domination. Because, just
as bombing planes could operate from Turkish territory, just as
navies could operate through the straits into the Black Sea (as they
did in the Crimean War-the one case in modern times in which
Russia was successfully invaded)-by the same token, this fort
ress, being just as defensible from the south and east as it is from
the north and west, could be the base for large scale air, land,
and sea operations.
It's a bit farther from Turkey to the Persian Gulf and its
great reservoir of oil (at least 40% of the world's known oil sup
ply is in that area) but it's not beyond effective bombing range
20
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of Turkish territory. The Mosul oil field is practically in sight of
the Turkish frontier (I must say, within sight of a highly mount
ainous area with very little land on which airfields could be built,
but nevertheless within easy range of other areas from which air
attacks might be mounted).
The possession, then, of this territory by either of two op�
posing world powers (the Soviet Union or the United States)
would be a peril to the other. And I think it's only fair to follow
our imagination a little further and say that the policies of the
United States with respect to Turkey must be governed to a con
siderable degree by the foreseeable reactions to this or that move
which we can expect the RussiaI).s to have. Consequently you
are brought to this conclusion: if the United States embarked on
a policy of the kind of imperialism which we called "old fashioned,"
and undertook, through annoyance with the inefficiency of the
native inhabitants or for some other reason, to take over and op
erate Turkey, all Russian statesmen and strategists would have
a completely legitimate feeling that we were threatening their se
curity. Therefore, it is obviously appropriate that we should make
every effort, while maintaining our security in this area, not to
push our policy to the point where the Soviet planners and strate
gists would have legitimate grounds to feel that we were aiming
a dagger at their heart (an expression which they would no doubt
come to use).
I'm happy to say that, up to the present time, the policy
which the United States has followed with respect to Turkey has
been along the lines which I have just explained. The policy of
the United States has been to form what is, in effect, an informal
alliance with Turkey. It is an alliance which doesn't require that we
send military forces to this or that point, under this or that contin
gency, but an alliance in the sense that we are confident of Turkey's
21
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being on our side in any dispute between ourselves and the Soviet
Union. Therefore it is to our interest to have this small country in a
position to defend itself against attack which might come from the
Soviet Union. Consequently, the couple of hundred million dollars of
aid to Turkey which the United States is paying, is being used to
build up the defensive strength of the Turkish Republic. Some
of it is being used for longer range, and some for shorter range
purposes.

One of the most long range is the appropriation which is
being spent on the improvement of Turkish road communications
and transportation. There, our representatives have been able to
persuade the Turkish government to spend the ten million dollars
appropriated almost entirely for road making machinery; whereas
the Turkish government itself, from its own local resources, is pro
viding the labor and the material necessary for the construction
of a system of highways. This program will not make Turkey a
country like Rhode Island or Connecticut from the point of view
of roads, but will represent several hundred percent improvement
in the existing situation.
So our relations with Turkey amount, at the present time, to
an informal alliance. Now, if Turkey is an ally, it's very fair to ask,
"What kind of an ally?" I'll give you an example of what I mean.
In 1914, Russia had an ally in Serbia, and the adventurous policy
which was followed by the Serbian government led to a world war
in which the Russian empire was destroyed. We, in our relations
with Turkey, are in a somewhat similar position: here is a small
nation which is our ally; what kind of an ally? If that ally follows
an adventurous policy, the first thing we know we are going to find
ourselves involved in its quarrels with its neighbors-quarrels
which may not be of any particular int.erest to us, just as it was
of no immediate importance to the Russian government in 1914
to have the Archduke of Austria assassinated in Sarajevo.
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I'm merely bringing this out to show you how dangerous the
small ally can be to the greater ally. As far as Turkey is concerned,
the most important fact in this connection is that the men who are
ruling Turkey at the present time are ruling that small country
with the wisdom which they acquired in the process of losing a
large empire. The statesmen of Turkey are not peasants; they
are not newcomers on the scene of international politics; they, as
they would put it themselves, are "well cooked". They know their
business: they know what works in international politics; and they
know what doesn't work. They are very well aware that the worst
thing they could do, granted the informal nature of their alliance
with the United States, would be to stir up unnecessary friction
with their neighbors {particularly with the Soviet Union). In our
own country, with our foreign policy dependent upon public opin
ion-not just on the decisions of a few people in positions of high
command-we might be faced by the question "Will we save this
small ally from its own mistakes; will we go to war in a cause for
which we have very little sympathy?" Well, you and I know what
the answer would be. Under those circumstances, the United
States wouldn't go to war; the American people are not that kind of

warmongers. They've been accused of it from the other side of the
Atlantic and the Urals, but they are not that kind of war makers.
Fortunately the men who are operating the Turkish. state are fully
aware of this, and they are determined to follow a policy with

respect to their greater and smaller neighbors which is one hun
dred percent "correct" in the diplomatic sense. They are not going
to start any unnecessary rows.

What are the aims and policies, the resources and population
of the Turks? They believe, rightly or wrongly, that they have a
country capable of supporting a much larger population than is at

present in Turkey, and at a much higher standard of living than
they now enjoy. They want peace for survival, peace for develop-
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ment of their resources. I've used the word development, and I
think it should be defined a little more closely. What kind of de
velopment, what kind of ideals, do these people have before them,
of the society into which they want to develop? What kind of
nation do they want to be? A decision was reached by them
twenty-five years ago. At that time they chose between the so
'Ciety sponsored by Russia and the sort of society which Western
Europe and the United States represented. During the interven
ing years they have consistently maintained the same point of
view. What they want, as a people, is to become a nation like the
highly developed nations of Western Europe or like the United
States. They have no territorial ambitions at the present time.
They don't want to take any land from their neighbors. They want
to live, to survive in peace, to develop their resources, to work out
the many problems with which they are faced internally and be
come a nation as much like this country as they are able to become.
We are, to a certain extent, responsible for their having
this point of view. I hope that, since I was president of the Ameri
can colleges in Turkey, I may be allowed to do a little advertising
for a moment. The existence of American schools and colleges,
paid for by Americans (first by missionary-minded Americans and
later by the simple humanitarian type of benefactor and philan
thropist) has had a good deal to do with persuading the Turkish
people that they want to live the way Americans and British and
Western Europeans live.
Well, I've spoken again and again of the people. There are
about eighteen million people living in Turkey, and all of them
haven't been Turks. They have at present in their country, a num
ber of minorities. The one which is large enough to be significant,
amounting to a million and a half people out of the eighteen mil
lion, is the Kurdish minority. The Kurd tribesmen speak a language
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related to Persian. Each tribe has been an independent nation
ever since the beginning of history. They live in the territory
extending from a point near Alexandretta out to the Russian
frontier. They comprise about one million and a half people, living
mostly in the mountains. No previous Turkish government, in fact
no government of any kind, had ever subdued these people. Their
mountains were so rugged, and so high, and so miserably poor,
that it wasn't worth the investment in money and lives necessary
to subdue these people. The Turkish Republic, however, has sub
dued them, that is, all of those who live within Turkey . There are
considerable groups, half a million or more, living in Iran and Iraq.
But those living in Turkey are completely subjected at the present
time. They are not only subjected, but the Turks, with that wis
dom which they learned from losing an empire, having subdued
them in the military sense, having occupied every valley and every
hamlet in the whole country with considerable cost of life, then
said to the Kurds, "Now you are licked, you are Turks." It is the
same policy, in general, which the British government followed
in dealing with the Boers in South Africa, but proving in Turkey
much more effective tha:11 any one had thought possible.
I travelled through that entire country last summer; talked
with hundreds of people in the region, and I came away with the
impression that the one big minority problem of Turkey is licked
and that within a few years there won't be any people in Turkey
who consider themselves Kurds. The young men are all going
into the military service and they like it. They come back proud
of their service ribbons. They come back with the title of Sergeant,
which they wear throughout life. They tell the people in the
mountain villages in which the governments have forced them to
settle, "We are smarter than the Turks are; we should all go out
into Western Turkey and make our fortunes and then come back
here and live happily." They have come to think of themselves
as members of the Turkish community.
25
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There are other minorities; one consists of Greek-speaking
people, about one hundred thousand, all of whom live near or in
the city of Istanbul or Constantinople. An Armenian-speaking
minority live in the same area, and the eighty thousand or more
Jews in the country are scattered through a few of the larger
- cities. The Greeks, who are not noted for their love of Turks,
nevertheless regard conditions in Turkey today (and quite right
ly so) as much superior to conditions in Greece at the present
moment. They are not making any effort to leave, or making any
trouble in Turkey.
The Armenians are in an extremely difficult position. They
are not regarded as first-class citizens (any more than the Greeks
or Jews are) in this Moslem country, but there is not much they
can do about it, so they are adjusting themselves to a position
somewhat like that which the Negroes occupy in the United
States. A good many Armenians were encouraged by the Soviet
government to leave Turkey, to leave Syria, even . the United
States, and go to the Soviet Republic of Armenia. I was up
there in that region last summer (I don't mean on the Russian
side of it but on the Turkish side) and I saw what was happening.
A good many of these Armenians who have gone there as settlers
in the Soviet-Armenian republic, flee from that country; they flee
to Turkey for safety and security. If any of you know of the re..;
lations between Turks and Armenians, you'll realize that the
last place you would expect an Armenian to go, seeking security,
is Turkey. That, perhaps, will give you some idea of how terrible
conditions are within Soviet-Armenia.
I'll take a moment to tell you what these people say
these refugees. They say that on arrival at Batumi, on the Black
Sea coast, they are immediately sent to labor camps. The younger
children are separated and are sent to special schools; families are
broken up. The older people, whom the Soviet-Communists don't
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expect to be able to convert to whole-hearted Communism, are sent
to labor camps where they get a full ration only if they do a full
days work (and a full ration consists of bread and cabbage soup).
In the various shifts around the country, all their goods were
stolen from them. Several boasted, when they came into Turkey,
that they were wearing suits which they had stolen from the
Russian guards. Those who can do a good day's work get a full
ration; those who can't, get a half ration, and they die of starva
tion before long. A good many, who have enough ambition and
energy left, try to escape, and they escape into Turkey. When they
come to the frontier they find in most places a barbed wire fence
to hold them in, and sentry boxes one hundred to one hundred and
fifty meters apart with sentries who shoot anyone crossing the
frontier. But, as is usually the case in these authoritarian regimes,
the authorities can't trust their subordinates. And so another
organization, other than the sentries, rakes the soil between these
sentry posts every morning; rakes it so that it's smooth; then if
they find any foot prints there, they shoot the sentries. Now
the refugees who do get out, get out through that as well as all the
other controls inside the country. That gives you some idea of
what conditions must be like behind the frontier for these im
migrants.
I've spoken of the minority populations in Turkey. What
about the politics of Turkey? Now politics is the business of power
internally, within the country. What is the situation? Up until
two and one half years ago, Turkey was ruled by one party, a
monolithic party. It was ruled this way: the President of the Re
public was also President of the Party. As President of the Party,
he chose all the party's candidates for parliament. The members
of parliament, whom he had chosen, elected him President. That's
what you might call a complete circle; perhaps not a vicious one,
but nevertheless it's a complete circle. It was hard to distinguish
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. between the Ministry of the Interior, which controls the police,
and the officials of the party. The local governor in a province

was appointed by the central government in Istanbul, not elected.
Usually the local governor was also head of the local party or

ganization.

Two and one half years ago, Turkey was not as yet an in
formal ally of the United States. Turkey had the idea of becom
ing a Western country-Western in politics as well as in economy

and society. But the people who were in charge of the government
were not in a hurry to make any moves which would result in the

loss of their jobs.

They realized the status of General Franco in

his relations with the United States, and of a few other countries

with which alliance could not be contracted by the United States
government because of the bad press which they enjoyed as a result
of their having a fascist or semi-fascist type of regime. When the
President of Turkey and his advisers realized the situation, they
decided to move, more rapidly than they had planned, in the direc

tion of a genuine democratic system. And consequently you had
the emergence of a new party, the second party. This had been
tried a couple of times in the past, but the results had not been
happy for the people who tried it. This time the new party was
founded under the leadership of a former Prime Minister, with
the obvious approval and consent of the President of the Repub
lic. Shortly thereafter, there was a general election. In that
election the new party won only'about sixty members of the parlia
ment, whereas the old established party won over three hundred
members. The opposition party claimed that the elections were
finagled-that there was all kinds of skull-duggery practiced.
From what I was able to discover in talking to a great many
people last summer, in the big coastal cities, where there were
plenty of foreign observers around, the elections were absolutely
honest. As you went away from the coast, and left the foreign
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observers behind, there was increasing government police pressure
upon people to vote in favor of the party in power. Those of
you who have cruised around South American waters are very ·

familiar with the type of proceding which I am hinting at. The
government saw to it, in other words, that there wasn't too much
open scuffle, but that it was a good sized majority-in fact a very,
very effective majority indeed.

This has been done partly because of the aims of the Turk

ish government and people, partly because of their desire to have

a good press in the United States, in order to make alliance with
Turkey possible not only for American soldiers and sailors but for

the American man in the street.

And they are succeeding; the

process is going on, and I suspect that if you had an election

tomorrow the opposition party would perhaps not win the election,

but it would win a vastly larger number of the parliamentary

seats.

In Turkish politics, there is no argument on foreign pol

icy. The foreign policy of all parties is identical.

It calls for co

operation with the United States and the allies of the United

States, and for maintenance against every threat against the in

dependence of the country. ·

Perhaps I might say a word here as to the morale of the

Turkish people.

The best illustration I can think of came from

the newspaper yesterday.

One of the leading writers of Turkey

turned communist, was prosecuted and, when he was indicted, he

disappeared.

He was tried in absentia and condemned to three or

· four months in prison. (I might say that all known communists in
Turkey are lodged permanently at government expense, in prison.

There are very few of them; they are not a great burden to the
finances.)

This man disappeared and nothing was heard of him

until the police caught a man who made it his business to spirit

people away from Turkey to Bulgaria and vice-versa.

When they
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gave the usual third degree treatment to this gentleman, they dis
covered that he had killed this prominent writer. His story was
that the prominent writer had come to him, offered him money
to be taken over into Bulgaria. The brigand didn't know who his
customer was until he got very close to the frontier, and then he
said, "I realized suddenly that this was the wicked communist
writer. I may have had some faults in the past but no one can
claim that I'm not a patriotic Turk. Under these circumstances
. what could I do? I couldn't take this man to a foreign country,
where he could safely attack the fatherland, so I killed him."
Now if the brigands and thieves talk this way, it gives you some
idea of the force, of the determination, of these people to main
tain themselves as an independent nation. I might say it turned
out later, after this gentleman had received some more third de
gree, that the writer had exhibited a very large roll of paper money
which may have had· something to do with the murder.
I shall not go on further with this, but I'll ask you to be
lieve that the vast majority of these people, close to one hundred
percent, are united, completely united, in foreign policy. The dif
ferences between the political parties �re domestic differences about
the rate at which changes should take place, about the kind of
reforms that should be adopted, and so on.
Now let's tu:rn to this question, "What does Turkey expect
of its relations with the United States?" First of all they ex-.
pect to get supplies, and they are getting them. They ·have bought
largely war surplus material and· they got it very cheap indeed,
at least in the earlier shipments. They want arms for their Army
and Navy. Their Army is always going to be more important to
them than either their Navy or Air Force, because they do not
have the technical facilities, they don't have the industry to sup
port as complicated an instrument as either a navy or an air force,
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They can!-t build ships, they can't build airplanes and they can't
even repair them because of their lack of technological development.
What they expect of us in navy and air force is minimum weapons;
enough to put on a show. Of course the Navy men want bigger and
better ships, and they are always asking for them, but they don't
really expect to get anything bigger than a light cruiser. They know
that they couldn't make any real use of anything except destroyers,
submarines, gunboats and that sort of thing.
In the event of war between Turkey and the Soviet Union, the
Turks don't expect massive American forces to be sent to their aid.
They believe that their Army, which is obviously their strongest and
most numerous group, if supplied with weapons and ammunition,
and if provided with a moderate amount of air cover, will be able
to defend the heart of the country until the Russians are so busy
elsewhere that they will be able to stabilize the situation to Turkey's
advantage.
So if a crisis should arise, the first thing that the Turks
would expect of us would be air support. And it's quite obvious that
the kind of air support that they would expect, first of all, would be
the kind that could be delivered on carriers. Whether or not it's
feasible to send carrier aircraft there to operate in the Black Sea
or short of the Black. Sea, is a technical question which you gentle
men can answer much better than I..
What-would we expect from this informal alliance which
seems to exist? Turkey, as you see, wants to survive; that's the
motive all the way through. What we want, it seems to me, is first
of all to keep Turkey out of the hands of the Soviet Union. If Turkey
were occupied and held by the Soviets, the entire Eastern Mediter,
ranean would be shut off as far as we are concerned. It would per,
mit att!lck, both by air and by land, against the great oil-bearjng
. 3
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territories around the Persian Gulf and, although we could fight a
war without that oil, we don't have any allies in Europe who could
fight a war without the oil of the Persian Gulf. Therefore, our
first point is to keep Turkey within the area that we can do busi
ness with and preclude the Russians' taking it over.
More specific, what can we expect the Turks to do in a mili
tary way? Again there are technical questions which you'll know
better how to answer than I, but obviously it's going to take time;
time is going to be an important factor. Can we so prepare the
Turks that they could maintain themselves until such time as we
could bring forces to the Persian Gulf area (which is the most vital
of all these areas as far as I can see), so that we could bring forces
there adequate to defend them even if the Turks were wiped out?
That's a militarily important question, but evidentally we think
there is some possibility, militarily, or else we wouldn't be engaged
in sending arms to Turkey and in training Turkish officers and men
for defense.
Now another point, which I think is a very moot point but
one which we should discuss and understand clearly. Although we
have an arrangement with Greece, and an informal alliance with
Turkey, we have no formal or informal arrangement with Iran.
That leaves open the possibility that Iran might be used to outflank
Turkey, and a Russian attack might pass down toward the Persian
Gulf, first through Iran, and then Iraq to the Persian Gulf. If
there were a strong Turkish Army to the West, capable of receiving
extensive reenforcements, particularly in air power, I very much
doubt that any Russian commanding officer would want to send
forces down there within range of Turkish air fields.
Again there is the question: "Would the Turks be prepared
to let us use their airfields?" That too depends upon imponderable
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factors-the development of relations between the Turks and their
neighbors and between the Turks and ourselves. As matters are
now moving, I think it is not probable, but very possible, that we
would be in a position, through the arms which we have given to
Turkey, to make that outflanking movement too risky for the
Soviet to undertake.
Well, what are the hopes, what are the fears of the moment?
Obviously, from the Turkish point of view, the hope is that if they

are involved in a war with Russia, the only nation they fear, it will
be a war of a kind which will inevitably involve both Great Britain
and the United States.

As far as the United States is concerned,

we hope that our arming of Turkey will deter the Russians from
an attack, and that the contingency against which we are preparing
will never arise.

And finally, I think we have to face this question, "How

long will the type of arrangements, which we now have, last? Is it
just a short-term policy or is it a long-term policy?" Long term

policies depend upon community of interests between nations ; not
sentiments, but common interests. And, as I said earlier, our in
terest is not to occupy and administer Turkey, but to make Turkey
strong enough to occupy and administer herself and prevent any out

side power from taking over. We want an independent nation that
will add to our security in the Near East. It has to be Turkey, be
cause it is from Turkey that the oil, which is essential to our having
any effective allies, can be defended. So with this community of in

terest which exists, namely, survival of the Turks as an independent
nation (that interest being the same for them as for us) I think
that there is every ptospect of a long duration to the present type of
informal alliance.
And I can say this as a final word. Last summer I talked

with thousands of Turks, and with dozens of Americans, includ-
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ing the heads of the Naval and Army missions in Turkey, the Am
bassadors and many of the Ministers of the Turkish Cabinet.

Thus far our people, military and civilian, have been operating
with a high degree of good sense and tact and understanding,
pushing ahead with their work, obviously not interested in taking
over Turkey as a conquered state. They have been doing all this
with such success that there is not yet any serious cloud on the
horizon as far as Turko-American relations are concerned.

Turkey is important because of its position,, because of its
morale, because of its point of view. It is important to the United
States and the United States is important to Turkey. Our informal
alliance is working and is working very well indeed, and I think we
have every reason to be satisfied with the present state of affairs.
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LIGHT WITHOUT HEAT
An article by

Lieut. Commander R. E. Williams

(SC)

USN

The fact that modern warfare is everybody's business was
distinctly underscored by the proceedings of the War College Round
Table Discussions held during the first week of May, 1949. These
conferences, conceived with a view to obtaining the very best in cur
rent strategic thinking, were attended by outstanding men in civilian
life and high ranking officers from all branches of the Armed
Forces.

To the officers of the Naval War College the discussions sum
marized everything that had gone before in ten months' work on
tactical problems, employment of forces, weapon capabilities, war
potential, mobilization and grand strategy. To the civilian guests
they represented an opportunity to participate in a stimulating ex
change of ideas in an atmosphere of professional competence rather
than one of amateur speculation.

To everyone they offered the

priceless advantage of access to all other participants, whether
across the conference table, over a cup of coffee, or simply in the
wardroom of the USS Kearsarge, aboard which many of the guests
were billeted.
The discussion groups, as finally constituted, included representatives of four principal experience categories:
(a )

Staff and student officers of the Naval War College;

(b)

Representatives of other Service Colleges;

(c)

Outstanding Naval Reserves Officers on temporary active
duty;

Lieut.· Commander Williams is a member of the Naval War Col
lege Staff. His article is an appraisal of the Round Table Discussions
conducted by the War College during the week 4-11 May, 1949.
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Prominent authors and newspapermen, business and in-:
dustrial leaders, and noted public servants.

From a body composed of such diverse elements, the Naval

War College was justified in expecting a notable amount of worth

while fact, opinion and conclusions which it did indeed receive in

gospel measure.

The wholehearted participation of the War Col

lege guests was a particularly gratifying feature of these dis

cussions.

Organized into nineteen small discussion groups, each. a

representative cross section of the guest list, and presided over by

a War College student moderator, officers and civilians alike sat

down together to examine the factors influencing the national

strategy of the United States. In an atmosphere of complete aca

demic freedom, without rivalry or rancour and in a spirit of dis

passionate inquiry, they spent six days in friendly, constructive
discussion of problems common to all of them as American citi
zens: What are the fundamental issues involved in the struggle

between countries separated by the "Iron Curtain"?

What factors

exert a major influence in determining the world situation? What
are, or should be, our own national objectives? How do we attain

them?

What are the means-military, political, economic, ideo

logical-at our disposal for attaining those objectives?

Other questions, proceeding out of the answers to these or

iginal ones, were carefully scrutinized.

Each group appeared to

absorb, almost without consciously realizing it, the philosophy

stressed in the keynote address:

"What we are seeking most

earnestly is to demonstrate that it is possible for men of good will

to sit down together regardless of the color of, or the lack of, a

uniform."
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Thus it was that each of the discussion groups proceeded
through six days, examining our national objectives and the means,
both military and otherwise, of obtaining them, and ending with a
concept of the future strategy of the United States. It is perhaps
inaccurate to state that any of the groups actually derived its own
"concept". The exercise was essentially an individual one, and it
is more nearly accurate to say that the participating members ar
rived at their individual concepts, which generally agreed in prin
ciple with the others, but differed in various particulars. This was
to be expected, for the purpose of the Naval War College is not to
determine national strategy. That is the duty of the planning
staffs in Washington. The War College seeks to develop the think
ers who will eventually do that kind of planning.
It is worthwhile noting that if the individual concepts dif
fered in the methods of our strategy they were solidly agreed on its
philosophy; that by no possil;>le stretch of the imagination or con
science �ould we bring ourselves to initiate an aggressive "pre
ventive" war; that the rank and file of a Communist-dominated
country, far from being the exponents of their government, are its
principal victims; that our Armed Forces, if it is necessary to use
them, must be employed as an instrument of liberation rather than
annihilation; that our Military Establishment remains-for all its
size and power-only a part of the forces at our command and
therefore it must be regarded at all times as the tool of state policy,
not its master.
Out of the conferences came many valuable lessons and en
lightening experiences, but perhaps more gratifying than anything
else was the circumstance under which men from all over the
country and of many stations and occupations could freely assemble,
freely speak and write, could lay aside prejudices and differences
and could demonstrate that all of them were first and above all else,
American Citizens.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1949

41

Naval War College Review, Vol. 2 [1949], No. 7, Art. 1

RESTRICTED

RECOMMENDED READING
For those officers wishing to pursue a course in professional
reading, the Naval War College Reading List is published here
with. The list contains books and articles in many varied fields
totaling over 13,000 pages. Officers at the Naval War College are
urged to read selectively from the many categories during their ten
months' course for a total of 5,000 pages.

GEOPOLITICS

Linton

Most Of The World
New York:
873 pp.

Columbia University Press, 1949.

Descriptions of the geography, natural resources, populations,
and of political and other basic factors in most of the countries
of the world.
New Compass Of The World
New York:
375 pp.

Weigert and
Stefansson

Macmillan, 1948.

A symposium on world political geography which includes
articles by many noted authors on the influence of geography
on the course of history.
The Geography Of Air Transport
Washington, D. C.:
64 pp.

Van Zandt

Brookings Institution, 1944.

The first of three volumes dealing with problems of world air
transport. This volume (Vol. 1) deals with the purely geo
graphical aspects of air transport, evaluating the world's air
routes as to economic, military and linear factors.
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Sprout

Foundations Of National Power
(Selections)

Princeton, N. J.:

Princeton University Press, 1945

Readings on world politics and American security; speeches,
papers, and essays from books by Lippman, Welles, Chamber
lin and many others.

Democ-ratic Ideals And Reality
New York:
208 pp.

Mackinder

Holt, 1919.

This book, first published in 1919 and reissued unchanged in
1942, deals with "Grand Strategy"-the integration of the
military, political, economic, geographic, and psychological fac
tors of national power. Emphasis is placed on the development
of the "Heartland" theory and the conflict between land power
and sea power.
Strausz-Hupe

Geopolitics
New York:
274 pp.

G. P. Putnam & Company, 1942.

This book traces with keen insight the trend of thought from
Mahan and Mackinder through Homer Lea and Ratzel to
Haushofer and the Munich Work-Group for Geopolitik.

GEOGRAPHY
The Medite"anean, Its Role In
America's Foreign Policy
New York:
185 pp.

Reitzel

Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1948

A study of foreign relations and power politics in the Mediter

ranean area, with the main emphasis on U. S., British and
Soviet relations in recent years.

Josephs

Latin America
New York:
492 pp.

Random House, 1948.
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A report on the present political and economic situation in Cuba
and in each of the South American countries except Paraguay.
A straight-forward and apparently unbiased report.
Fairbank

The United States and China
Cambridge:
367 pp.

Harvard University Press, 1948.

Professor Fairbank states that his purpose is "to indicate some
of the major currents which now form the tide of social change
in China" and "to summarize the major patterns of thought
and conduct, the major political and economic forms" which are
ingrained in Chinese society. This purpose he accomplishes ad
mirably.
Speiser

The United States And The Near East
Cambridge:
246 pp.

Harvard University Press, 1947 .

Brief explanation of the geographic and cultural background of
the Near East, followed by a summary of political developments
in that area up to the present time. Concise, scholarly and un
biased.
FOREIGN

Britain:

AFFAIRS

Partner For Peace

New York:
161 pp.

Corbett

Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1946.

A thorough study of the position of England with respect to

the United Kingdom, the Empire, the Commonwealth, and the
world.

The Charter Of The United States
Boston:
658 pp.

Goodrich-Hambro

World Peace Foundation, 1949.

Recognized as the best work on the Charter of the United
Nations. A comprehensive discussion and interpretation of
each article of the Charter. Very valuable for reference pur41
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poses and recommended for study by those with a particular in
terest in international relations.
Major Problems of U. S. Foreign Policy
Washington, D. C.:
241 pp.

Brookings Institution, 1948:

An excellent survey of the basic questions of foreign policy.
Published annually. Monthly supplements, entitled "Summary
of Developments in Major Problems of U. S. Foreign Policy",
are issued by the publishers.
The North Atlantic Treaty
Washington, D. C.:
2 pp.

Government Printing Office, 1949.

Department of State Publication 3464. The preamble and text
of the North Atlantic Treaty.
The Western Hemisphere Defense Pact
Washington, D. C.:
2 pp.

Government Printing Office, 1947.

The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.
Executive Report No. 11.
MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

Ah Power In War
London:
124 pp.

Tedder

Hodder and Stoughton, 1949.

A distinguished officer of the Royal Air Force discusses sonie
of the effects of the impact of air power on the course of
World War II.
Bombing And Strategy
London:
90 pp.

Dickens

Sampson Low, Marston & Co., 1947.
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In this short book the author analyzes and criticizes British
aerial strategy (particularly strategic bombing) of World War
II, and reaches several important conclusions concerning the
use of the armed forces of a maritime power.
Livesey

Mahan On Sea Power
Norman, Okla.:
300 pp.

University of Oklahoma Press, 1947.

An interpretation and evaluation of Admiral Mahan's theories
of sea power and its effect on history. The list of Mahan's
writings, which is included, is complete and provides a useful
guide for anyone who desires to study the development of these
theories.

The Future Employment Of Naval Forces

Nimitz

U. S. Department of the Navy, 1948
12 pp.
A short paper expressing the views of Fleet Admiral Chester
W. Nimitz on the function of naval forces in maintaining the
future security of the United States.
Some Principles Of Maritime Strategy
New York:
278 pp.

Corbett

Longmans, Green & Co., 1911

A classic work on naval strategy by a distinguished British
naval writer.
The Atom Bomb
96 pp.
Part II (pages 324-418) of the March 1947 issue of "Air Af
fairs". Articles by officers of the Army, Navy, Air Force and
by distinguished civilians dealing with the impact of the atomic
bomb on society.
The Role Of Sea Power In Global Warfare Of The Future

Rosinski

From Brassey's Naval Annual, 1947.
14 pp.
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A brief article in which Dr. Rosinski develops the thesis that
sea power will continue to be a fundamental and decisive his
torical force.
Rosinski

The Place Of War In History
From "Infantry Journal", November, 1947.
7 pp.

A critical analysis of Cyril Fall's short sixteen page booklet
entitled "The Place of War in History", which booklet should
be read in conjunction.
Sun Tzu

The Art Of War
Harrisburg, Pa.:
97 pp.

Military Service Publishing Co., 1944.

A 1944 edition of the Giles translation. The book comprises
thirteen short chapters. In the first paragraph Sun Tzu writes:
"The art of war is of vital importance to the state. It is a
matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin.
Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be
neglected". From that point he proceeds to an enunciation of
the principles of war, and to an examination of their applica
tion.
Linebarger

Psychological Warfare
Washington, D. C.:
251 pp.

Infantry Journal Press, 1948.

Covers the historical background, functions, limitations, and
applications of the science of psychology to the conduct of war.

Airborne Warfare
Washington, D. C.:
175pp.

Gavin
Infantry Journal Press, 1947.

A very interesting, well written book by an officer of long and
varied experience. It goes briefly into the history of airborne
operations, reviews some of the highlights of the major air
borne operations of World War II, and then delves into the
future.
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Baldwin

The Price Of Power
New York:
32 8 pp.

Harper & Bros., 1948.

Produced by a group of specialists brought together by the
Council on Foreign Relations. The book considers the relative
positions (present and potential) of the United States and Rus
sia as regards political, economic, and strategic strengths, re
sources, man power, ideologies, and vulnerability.

Make-rs Of Modem Strategy (Selections)
Princeton, N. J.:

Earle

Princeton University Press, 1943.

This book is an outgrowth of a seminar on military affairs
which was conducted at the Institute for Advanced Study.
Twenty well known historians trace the development of modern
military thought in brief, and in some cases brilliant studies
of the contributions of Clausewitz, Jomini, Mahan, Douhet, and
Foch (among others) to current military thinking.
Mahan

Naval Strategy
Boston:
447 pp.

Little, Brown and Company, 1919.

This book is substantially a compilation of lectures delivered
by Captain Mahan at the Naval War College between the years
188 7 and 191 1. Naval strategy is compared and contrasted
with the principles and practice of military operations on land .
U. S. S. R.

AND

COMMUNISM

Sources Of Soviet Conduct

"X"

From "Foreign Affairs," July, 1947.
29pp.
A splendid (and brief) analysis of the interaction of Soviet
ideology and power and the role played by each in Soviet of
ficial conduct.
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"Historicus"

Stalin On Revolution

From "Foreign Affairs," January, 1949.
42 pp.

An authoritative analysis of Stalin's pronouncements and of
their influence on Communist thinking and policy throughout
the world.
Ebon

World Communism Today

New York:
482 pp.

Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1948.

Well balanced and objective discussion of the world Communist
situation and of possible developments.
The Strategy And Tactics Of World Communism

Washington, D. C.:
429 pp.

House Docu
ment ,#619

Government Printing Office, 1948.

A comprehensive, well documented report by sub-committee

No. 5 of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. It consists
of the report proper and two supplements. The report proper
covers the theory, practice and tactics of Communism. Sup
plement No. 1 "One Hundred Years of Communism" documents
and discusses the development and objectives of the Commun
ists, and is the major part of the report.Supplement No. 2 con
sists of official protests of the U.S. against Communist policies
or actions.
Pratt and Moore

Russia, A Short History

New York:
282 pp.

John Day Co., 1947.

An excellent history, interesting to read and valuable for
reference purposes.
Blueprint For World Conquest

Washington, D. C.:
258 pp.

Human Events, 1946..

The Communist equivalent of

Mein Kampf. It presents the
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thesis and programs of the Second and Sixth World Congresses
of the Communist International which were held in Moscow in
1920 and 1928.
LOGIC:

ENGLISH WRITTEN AND SPOKEN

How To Think Straight
New York:
246 pp,

Thouless

Simon & Schuster, 1939.

In direct, sprightly, nontechnical English, Professor Thoule�s
discusses the most effective ways of achieving and maintain
ing a clear-thinking, well-balanced and flexible mind.
The Art Of Plain Talk
New York:
194 pp.

Flesch

Harper & Bros., 1946.

A book that explains the art of plain talk. People whose busi
ness or desire it is to convey ideas will obtain valuable hints on
effective presentation.
Principles And Methods Of Discussion
New York:
452 pp.

McBurney & Hance

Harper & Bros., 1939.

A textbook designed to help those who lead or participate in
group or panel discussions, symposiums, and forums.
Principles And Types Of Speech
New York:
530 pp.

Monroe

Scott, Foresman & Co., 1939.

Good coverage of the basic principles of public speaking.
LEADERSHIP

Generals and Generalship
New York:
36 pp.

Wavell

Macmillan, 1943.
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The qualities that a general must possess, the abilities he must
have to handle his troops, and his relationship with the states
men who command his activities are ably presented by Field
Marshal Wavell in this book.
Lee's Lieutenants (Introduction to Vol. III)

New York:
17pp.

Freeman

Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942.

Sketches of the personalities who were the commanders under
Lee in the Army of Northern Virginia.
ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION
Brown

Organization, A Formulation Of Principle

New York:
308 pp.

Hibbert Printing Co., 1945.

A treatise on the basic principles of organization.
Mooney & Reiley

The Principles Of Organization

New York:
217 pp.

Harper & Bros., 1939.

The principles and structure of organization throughout his
tory with special reference to successful organizations which
have stood the test of time.
WORLD

WAR

II

W"ar Reports Of M.arshall, Arnold And King

Philadelphia:

(Selections)

J. B. Lippincott Co., 1947.

A factual and complete official account of the U. S. effort in
World War II. A basic historical document.
U.S. Naval Logistics In World W"ar II

Princeton:
301 pp.

Princeton University Press, 1947.

Ballantine
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The book confines itself primarily to discussion of National
and Departmental Logistics. In this restricted field the author
makes an excellent analysis of an important problem.

Crusade In Europe
New York:
478 pp.

Eisenhower
Doubleday & Co., 1948.

A work of great significance by the Supreme Commander,
Allied Expeditionary Forces.

Roosevelt And Hopkins
New York:
934 pp.

Sherwood

Harper & Bros., 1948.

A remarkable biographical work covering the pre-war and war
years. Sherwood is able to make the reader feel personally
present in the White House and at the conference tables.

Scientists Against Time
Boston, Mass. :
450 pp.

Baxter

Little, Brown & Co., 1946.

The Official history of the Office of Scientific Research and De
velopment-1940 to the War's end-in which is chronicled the
contribution of science to victory in World War II. Abundant
proof, if any is needed, of the decisive impact of science on
modern war.

Hitler And His Admirals
New York:
244 pp.

Martienssen

E. P. Dutton & Co., 1948.

In preparing this text the author has drawn upon the captured
archives of the German Navy. Between extensive quotations of
documents he has inserted an interpretative narrative to give
continuity. Brassey's Naval Annual 1948 contains the text of
the "Feuhrer Conferences" and is a better source for the basic
material.
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The Effects Of The Atomic Bomb On Hiroshima
And Nagasaki
Washington, D. C.:
43 pp.

U. S. S. B. S.

Government Printing Office, 1946.

A condensed but complete report on the effects of the two
bombs.
Nelson

Arsenal Of Democracy
New York:
431 pp.

Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1946.

Mr. Nelson sketches briefly the difficulties and problems which
arose in the setting up and functioning of Governmental Boards
and Offices designed to organize, control and channel the in
dustrial potential of the United States to meet the needs of the
allied war machine in World War II. The book presents numer
ous facts and details but the coverage is not as complete as
would be desirable.

The Second World War, 1939-1945
London:
431 pp.

Fuller

Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1948.

A review of the strategy of the war by one of England's most
capable authors in the military field. The work is appropriately
illustrated and incorporates the comments of many top ranking
German officers. A stimulating and provocative book.

Summary Reports, European And Pacific Wars
Washington, D. C.:
32pp.

U. S. S. B. S.

Government Printing Office, 1945-46.

A concise report of the results obtained by strategic bombing
in the European and Pacific Theaters including conclusions,
lessons learned and future trends.

The Gathering Storm
Boston:
667 pp.

Churchill

Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1948.
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No other statesman of our time has such a command of the
English language and few have played so large a part in the
making of modern history as has Mr. Churchill. In as much as
Churchill was Head of His Majesty's Government during the
period of World War II, he speaks with more authority here
than in his earlier books on the First World War.

Their Finest Hour
Boston:
630 pp.

Churchill

Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1949.

Volume II of Churchill's history of the Second World War.
This volume starts with the problems confronted by Churchill
as he assumed the office of Prime Minister in 1940 and covers
the Battle of France, Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain, and the
African campaign which culminated at Tobruk.
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